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CREATING AN ENABLING POLICY ENVIRONMENT FOR PROMOTION 
OF SMALL ENTERPRISES: TRADITIONAL AN1) INNOVATIVE APPROACHES 
1. Introduction 
The task of creating an enabling policy environment for small enterprises (SE) has been 
and remains a daunting one.1 The term "enabling" is appropriate, since when small enterprise 
successfully contributes to a good overall economic performance in a country it must usually 
supply nearly all of the effort, skills and dynamism itself; neither policy nor direct support can 
substitute on any large scale for whatever weaknesses and limitations smaller firms may have, 
in part because policy makers usually have difficulty interacting effectively with such enterprise, 
and in part because the sector is so large that it is implausible to think that public agencies could 
provide much of the needed resources and skills. The main ingredient of a good policy support 
for small enterprise is therefore the creation of a fostering environment, which provides the right 
incentives for small firms, together with enough positive support and protection (e.g. against 
unfair practices of larger competitors) to allow such firms to make the best of their potential. 
Many factors conspire to make this task difficult; it is useful to mention some of these, since 
they provide relevant background for the subsequent discussion of the evolution of policy away 
from more traditional approaches and towards other, hopefully more successful ones. They 
include: 
(i) the limited knowledge and understanding by policy makers and implementers of small 
enterprise, of its typical behaviour patterns and of its interface with the economic environment. 
The fact that small enterprises are numerous and diverse (ranging from traditional to relatively 
modern, belonging to different industries, having widely differing relationships with larger 
enterprise) makes direct familiarity with much of the sector unlikely. In most countries the 
number of serious studies of small enterprise and the amount of ex-post analysis of the impact 
on them of the economic environment and the policies pursued is very limited, such that the 
policy maker cannot draw too much from this source either. One specific but very important 
problem lies in the fact that most people who are knowledgeable about some aspects of small 
enterprises and their performance focus at the micro level. But understanding what makes an 
individual small firm successful is not the same as understanding what makes the small 
enterprise sector successful. Few people have focused on the second, undoubtedly more 
important question. 
(ii) lack of political and policy voice for small enterprise. Most governments are 
dominated by a combination of political interests representing large enterprise, sets of technicians 
with more knowledge about other sectors of the economy than small enterprise, and by organized 
labour and sometimes other groups. Small enterprise is seldom organized in such a way as to 
have much involvement or influence on public policy-making. Business associations, whether 
We include in this term both microenterprise and small and medium enterprise (SME) with say up to 50 or 
100 workers. 
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organized by industry or more broadly, tend to be dominated by large firms and to represent 
primarily the interests of those firms. Small enterprise associations often have trouble achieving 
the strength needed to get much influence. Contributing to the difficulty of effective 
organization is the incomplete mutuality of interest between microenterprise and small and 
medium enterprise (SME). 
(iii) the above mentioned lack of either interest or knowledge/expertise by policy makers 
contributes to a lack of attention to small enterprise. When interest is there, it is often misplaced 
due to the lack of knowledge; much of the assistance directed to microenterprise has been based 
on the paternalistic assumption that such units are seldom economically efficient, and are hence 
more appropriately the object of social than of economic policy. This simplistic view2 tends not 
to be held by the experts and students of the area, but they often have limited influence on 
policy. The present wave of anti-intervention thinking among economic policy-makers, whatever 
its general validity, may create problems for the design of good small enterprise policy since 
there are important arguments for intervention in support of this sector. Though one of the most 
important elements of a supportive enabling environment is well-functioning output and input 
markets, attaining such markets sometimes involves important but difficult types of intervention 
or involvement by the state. Finally, in many developing countries the macroeconomic crises 
of the last years have drained policy attention away from most other issues, including the small 
enterprise sector. The complex issues surrounding the sector mean that what is needed is a 
stable and knowledgeable approach, a far cry from the normal one. 
(iv) small enterprise does appear to need special treatment in various ways and it is 
important that its needs be taken into account, not just or perhaps not even primarily in terms 
of sector-specific policy designed to assist it but also in the areas of financial markets, the 
exchange rate, trade policy, labour market policy, environment policy and many others. 
Important aspects of the current economic and policy context in many countries are the 
presence of serious adjustment problems and/or the current or recent implementation of a series 
of economic reforms, among which a shift towards freer trade is a prominent component. 
Possibly related to these factors is the widespread tendency to increasing income inequality in 
many developing (and developed) countries. This trend highlights the importance of successful 
growth in the small enterprise sector, since in most countries the bulk of employment is found 
there, and the amount of productive employment which it generates is closely tied to the 
alleviation of poverty in the country. It is probably not an accident that the Third World market 
economies with the lowest levels of income inequality are also ones in which small enterprises 
have played an important role, as with Taiwan over a long period and Korea since the mid- 
l970s. It is possible that part of the negative distributional impact which seems to have 
accompanied the trade liberalization has been related to difficulties in the small enterprise sector 
in adjusting quickly to the new level of competition with imports or in export markets. 
2 A view which owes much to the erroneous tendency to equate efficiency with high labour productivity, use 
of modern technology and the like. Most careful studies find that much of the small scale sector is reasonably 
efficient when efficiency is measured properly (Liedhoim and Mead, 1987). 
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The trend towards globalization and freer trade creates both challenges and opportunities 
for small enterprise and for policy designed to maximize its contribution to social and economic 
welfare. Freer markets put some types of small enterprise in jeopardy, and should no doubt be 
complemented by short-run or longer run support policies to help some of these enterprises 
through the transition period. In countries where disinclination to intervention and/or incapacity 
to do it effectively precludes such policies, the sector may be seriously affected and the health 
of the economy along with it. But where this is not the case, or where small enterprise is 
generally less vulnerable, the push towards more market-oriented policies may create more 
opportunities than it does threats. 
2. Broad Factors Facilitating the Creation and Health of Small Enterprises 
Identifying the set of factors which facilitate creation and successful development of small 
enterprise is the starting point for an effective support policy. Any list is somewhat arbitrary, 
but one useful categorization involves distinguishing (i) availability of entrepreneurial skills; (ii) 
timely access to the factors of production (labour, capital, technology, etc.) and to product 
markets; and (iii) protection from unfair practices on the part of other firms (market 
discrimination, harassment, etc.). 
Optimal policy in each of the three areas depends, among other things, on the state of 
affairs in the other areas. Thus, if entrepreneurial talent is very widespread, it will be less 
important to have the favourable input and output market conditions which make the 
entrepreneur's task easier, diminish the risks involved, etc. 
Public policy is likely to be important in each of the three categories cited. In the past, 
most of the conscious small enterprise policy has focused in the second, and with the particular 
modality of direct state involvement, as in state development banks, public sector technical 
assistance, etc. More than complementing the activities of private firms in, say, the financial 
and technical assistance areas, these have involved substituting for what was felt to be the 
inadequate performance of these latter. 
In general the character of the support for small enterprise, probably both for 
microenterprise and for SME, has gradually shifted towards policies with a lighter touch, 
policies which rely more on complementing the market than replacing it, and, hopefully, ones 
which reflect a better understanding of the characteristics and modus operandi of small firms and 
of markets. Yet it must be confessed that in none of these areas are we yet very far advanced; 
though understanding of how various types of more general economic policy affect smaller 
enterprise has advanced, there is often little recognition or action on this front. In many 
countries there is a special small enterprise policy, rather than a consideration of small enterprise 
needs in the framing of all aspects of economic policy. 
Well-functioning markets (related to points (ii) and (iii) above) are very important to 
many smaller enterprises for two main reasons. First, such firms find it hard to undertake as 
much of a total production process as do larger firms. Managing the whole process is hard 
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productive small firms in a given industry may not be created or may not survive. When this 
is the case, the health of small firms in any given industry will tend to be positively related to 
the prevalence of small firms in the related industries. When an economy has many small and 
medium firms in a number of industries, then it is easier for others to get a start and do well. 
The best environment for small enterprise is probably one in which the markets relevant 
for them function well on their own, without public sector intervention. A major puzzle for 
policy in this area, however, is whether considerable direct support of some traditional types 
(subsidized credit and the like) is advisable when, as is normally the case, such markets are far 
from this ideal state. The complementing provided by vigorous small-scale input and service 
suppliers cannot be reproduced by any feasible government involvement, but it may nonetheless 
be useful. It is hard to assess relative merits of different approaches in this difficult world of 
the "second best". 
Government Attitude to Small Firms 
A government which is serious about reaping the benefits of a healthy small enterprise 
sector requires both a professional understanding of the role of such firms, including the absence 
of paternalistic attitudes, feelings that whatever is done for such firms is done in the name of 
social policy rather than with economic objectives, and so on. It also requires a strong cadre 
of support/regulatory workers, relatively well paid, having some degree of prestige, adequately 
prepared, etc. The details of how to organize such support/regulation systems and the options 
seriously available in different types of countries will vary. In some cases the only approach 
may be a semi-private one, whereby the government farms out the functions which need to be 
performed. In any case, there is an immense gap in the quality of such systems across 
countries. It is important to consider simultaneously the whole government apparatus which 
affects and partially defines the economic environment of smaller firms. In some cases the 
relevant apparatus is essentially expLoitative, as where a large amount of bureaucratic red tape 
is the vehicle whereby rent-seeking officials attempt to extract money from firms. Clearly it is 
important to avoid the presence of nonsense red-tape since it helps to bring into existence such 
an exploitative public sector worker. Obviously, it is important to monitor the presence of such 
exploiters. At the other end of the spectrum is the essentially positive public servant, who 
approaches the small enterprise as an entity to be assisted where possible. Such a servant must 
of course understand the logic of certain controls, so that he/she does not try to help the firm 
to avoid them but to deal with them in the cost minimizing way. Most countries have substantial 
elements of both the exploitative and the supportive together with other shades of grey in 
between. In most cases however, both the amount of resources funnelled into such support and 
the quality of the workers accurately reflects a lack of government recognition of the potential 
importance of this sector and the related lack of dedication to helping it and setting a healthy 
environment. 
A complicating feature with respect to the role of public policy lies in the danger of the 
public sector itself becoming the monopolist in the provision of a particular service. The costs 
of such an outcome are similar in part to those when a private sector monopoly damages the 
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when a variety of skills and resources are needed and when some stages of production are 
characterized by significant economies of scale; in such cases economic logic suggests that many 
small firms would specialize in just one or a few stages of the total process, in which case their 
fate becomes dependent on how well a variety of input markets serve their needs--the 
coordination function demanded of the market is bigger in that case. Second, small firms are 
more vulnerable to the use of market power than are larger rivals, and hence more dependent 
on some set of controls (institutional, legal, moral, or whatever) to keep the misuse of power 
within bounds. To date most policy directed towards supporting small enterprise has involved 
direct intervention or involvement by the state--in credit programs, technical assistance, and so 
on. An element of the challenge at present is to find ways which involve making private 
markets work better rather than replacing them. Although the trend is generally in this direction 
at present, this is a much more subtle task, and hence one about which it is hard to feel much 
confidence of success in the short run. Many of the contributors to the shift of economic policy 
towards the market and away from state involvement are not inclined to contribute ideas and 
support for the "light touch" approach, some feeling that it is risky to accept any sort of 
intervention in the market. 
When markets do work effectively they facilitate and take advantage of the 
complementarities across different firms and types of firms, as in the case of subcontracting. 
When they function badly they fail in this positive function while permitting the sort of 
malfunctioning mentioned in point (iii) above. 
Given both their small size and scope and their related vulnerability to outside forces, the 
health of many small firms depends on the existence of a symbiotic relationship with other firms. 
One such type of symbiosis is with large firms, usually via subcontracting. The extent to which 
this phenomenon can contribute to the number and the productivity of smaller firms, with 
associated high level of employment creation, is well exemplified by the case of Japan and some 
other countries of Southeast Asia. Its merits have led other countries to try to emulate this 
success by trying to induce and facilitate large-small interactions; in most cases the results have 
thus far been modest at best. At the other end of the spectrum is a different type of symbiosis-- 
that among small firms themselves, sometimes in the same activity and sometimes in 
complementary activities. Considerable attentionhas been focused recently on the externalities 
among groups of small firms engaged in the same activity (e.g. small exporters in manufacturing 
and agriculture);3 the group can provide economies of scale in certain functions for which the 
individual firms are too small to do so, while leaving independence to each firm in its other 
functions. Another form of symbiosis is among small firms engaged in different but activities 
which trade with each other. A major impediment to the health of some small firms is that large 
suppliers and buyers do not want to deal with them, either because they simply prefer buying 
and selling in bulk or because the information costs of dealing with many firms are too high. 
Large firms in one business tend to deal with large firms in other businesses and small ones with 
small ones. If there are few or no small scale input suppliers and output buyers, potentially 
Relevant studies are those of Klein (1995) and Rhee (1990). 
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interests of small enterprise. But where the public sector is less efficient than the private one 
the costs are higher. And it is obviously difficult for governments to control the impulse of their 
own institutions to strive for and maintain monopoly positions; asking the government to throw 
public agencies into competitive situations in which they may look bad is asking a lot--not 
necessarily impossible but obviously not easy or feasible under all circumstances. 
Some of the elements of small enterprise policy and its evolution towards new approaches 
are summarized in Diagram 1. It should be noted that some trends in the composition of that 
policy and in how it is effected are the result of increased understanding of the sector's needs, 
others of changes in the objective situation, e.g. the sort which make it possible to complement 
market forces because those forces are working more effectively. It should also be noted that 
much policy in this area is defacto experimental; it remains to be seen how well it will work 
out. 





the Mechanisms and 
Small Enterprise Policy Policy Areas 
1. More market-complementing rather than 1. Entrepreneurial development, 
market-substituting 
2. Credit 
2. More indirect, designed to induce 
certain types of market behaviour 3. Technology/technical assistance 
3. More professional (informed); positive 4. Labour market 
(less paternalistic, harassing, corrupt) 
5. Used machinery 
4. More involvement of local governments 
and less of national government; more of 6. Foreign exchange/exchange rate 
NGOs/ industry associations/universities, 
etc. 7. Product markets 
5. More through general economic policies 8. Links with large firms 
and less through sectoral policy 
9. Assistance in exporting 
10. Infrastructure 
11. Macroeconomic policy 
(monetary/fiscal/trade) 
12. Environmental policy 
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3. Trends and Innovations in the Processes of Decision-Making and Regulation 
Weaknesses in terms of the content of past policy for smaller enterprises have been partly 
a result of the process of decision-making, who has voice, etc., as well as the simple lack of 
information on some issues. A high degree of centralization, together with a lack of effective 
consultation/interaction with relevant parties who might be useful, has probably been responsible 
for much of the disinformation about the sector and its functioning. A number of countries have 
been undertaking a desirable shift away from such a pattern towards one which increases the 
involvement in policy making and execution of one or more of: local government, business 
associations, and small entrepreneurs themselves. The design of courses for small entrepreneurs 
and their workers, of technical assistance systems, and sometimes of credit systems can all 
benefit from the involvement of these groups. 
Several general considerations, and evidence from a number of countries, point to a 
potentially valuable role for local government, which when it is endowed with a reasonable level 
of overall capacity may handle some aspects of policy-making, operations and liaising with small 
enterprise better than could the national government (Storper, 1991). Industrial policy at the 
local level appears to be coming into its own, as decentralization proceeds, along a variety of 
paths, in developing countries. A decent local government knows local conditions and needs 
better than the national government, as often interacts more easily and effectively with local 
business; small enterprises often have more economic weight in a given region than in the 
nation, and are thus accorded greater consideration. One interpretation of the impressive 
performance of Italian small enterprise (e.g. in international markets) is the effective interface 
between municipal government (with a long and special involvement in the local economy) and 
small business. Some recent experiments in Argentina are also promising along these lines 
(Gatto, 1992). Four local centres for SME are being established to foster a demand and supply 
for SME-related services; the government will lend financial support in the first four years with 
the expectation that the centres would then be self-financing. 
The importance of involvement by business associations lies in their direct knowledge of 
the needs of their affiliates, and in the fact that the responsibility of an active role in influencing 
public policy may have the added benefit of increasing contacts among smaller enterprises, 
leading to collective action on other fronts and to information benefits: contact with other SME 
and with larger firms in the same sector is an important source of information for many SME. 
Even for types of decisions which do or must stay lodged in the public sector, the 
development of effective means of consultation with the private sector is essential. In dealing 
with public sectors which while not totally inept suffer from limited responsiveness and other 
weaknesses, the input from the private sector can raise the quality of programs, keep them 
relevant and, over the course of time, increase the mutual respect between business and 
government which is a prerequisite for certain types of policies and interactions to pay off to the 
maximum. There are now many examples of small business organizations working with 
government. But it is a permanent struggle for them to achieve much voice, especially if they 
operate in the same sector as large firms. This is partly a matter of a country's social and 
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political evolution. In Indonesia, for example, it is still difficult for small enterprise to organize 
on its own, whereas in many countries of Latin America this is now taking place. 
Curbing Red Tape 
There is no doubt that much government regulation in many countries has not only not 
had a positive function but has been damaging to such groups as small enterprise, both because 
it used public resource to no positive effect, creates costs for small firms and leads to bribery 
and corruption in the public sector. A recent World Bank study designed to quantify the costs 
to small exporters of some of the red tape suggests that the costs have been substantial. 
It remains to be seen how much small enterprise dynamism can be unleashed by ending 
pernicious regulation. No doubt it will be much less than optimists (on this count) like de Soto 
(1986) expect since small enterprises evade much of the red tape, and since rational rent-seeking 
public officials do not normally exploit their victims to the point of causing them to fail. 
4. Policy Trends and Innovative Approaches in Specific Policy Areas 
In this section we comment on some of the policy areas relevant to the success of small 
enterprise, and on the evolution of approaches within those areas including newer and innovative 
ones. 
4.1. Entrepreneurship 
Clearly the success of small enterprise starts with a strong supply of entrepreneurial 
talent. It is not an accident that two of the great performers in terms of growth, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong, have been characterized both by the dominance of smaller establishments in the 
industrial structure an4., underlying this, by an impressive supply of entrepreneurial talent. The 
quality of management/entrepreneurship has emerged as the most important determinant of the 
economic performance of SE in a number of microeconomic studies (Bruch and l-liemenz, 1984, 
100), and management weaknesses have been fingered as the primary cause of failure among SE 
in the Philippines (Itao, 1980). The issue here is how policy can help to strengthen the 
entrepreneurial capacities of the country, complement those capacities as well as possible, and 
partially substitute for them when they are not strong. 
With most entrepreneurs having serious deficiencies in one or another aspect of business 
management, and with markets and contexts changing faster than before, there is a major 
challenge to upgrade the skills of a large number of entrepreneurs quickly. Most entrepreneurs 
in SMEs do not have university backgrounds (many are former workers); only a few 
microentrepreneurs do. It is clear that various types of education and training pay off in greater 
entrepreneurial capacities, though it is always important to remember that all such 
education/training must complement basic entrepreneurial skills, some of which may be innate 
and others learned on the job. Recent surveys in several countries, including Colombia and 
Indonesia (Levy et al, 1994), report that the prevalence of university trained entrepreneurs is 
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much higher for exporting SMEs than for SMEs as a whole, a fact which warrants both attention 
and study. 
The countries which seem to have put most emphasis on training of entrepreneurs are 
those where the government sees a special need to foster the entrepreneurial proclivities and 
capacity of a particular group, as in Malaysia and Indonesia where preparatory courses are given 
to introduce nationals (Malays/bumiputra and Indonesians/pribumi respectively) to business 
activities. Clapham (1985, 133) sees preparatory courses as the responsibility of state 
institutions, whereas basic courses for already active entrepreneurs can usefully be provided by 
both public and private sector institutions. He notes that many small management institutes and 
private business schools have been set up in Malaysia and Indonesia and that there is a ready 
market for their services (ibid, 135). While it is naturally difficult to gauge the benefit/cost ratio 
of such training activities, a lively demand bodes well. 
At the university level there is increasing awareness in developing as well as developed 
countries that training for work in SMEs should be a part of business school and/or engineering 
curricula. In 1993 a new university was founded in Argentina to focus on SME. The Institute 
of Business at the University of the West Indies came into existence partly in response to a felt 
need for training which would produce effective SME entrepreneurs. Colombia has a small 
university dedicated to training SME entrepreneurs. In future a higher and higher share of SME 
and even microenterprise entrepreneurs will have university training, which makes it doubly 
important that part of the curriculum prepare them as well for these functions as possible. Only 
in a minority of countries (e.g. Korea--see Kim and Nugent, 1994) does there seem to be a 
strong network of professional contacts between university departments and faculty and SME, 
allowing SMEs access to the professional skills of university faculty via consulting arrangements, 
for example. 
A major challenge in many countries, to which some appear to be responding in 
interesting ways, is that of providing the training facilities and courses needed by SMEs, 
microentrepreneurs and their workers. Most countries have some form of national system for 
industrial training, but in many it defacto if not dejure directed its attentions to the needs to 
larger enterprise in the early stages of ISI industrialization. Re-orienting such entities to make 
them useful to small enterprise, which cannot necessarily articulate its needs as clearly, and 
whose needs may change rather quickly over time, is a real challenge for such institutions. 
The role of NGOs, often affiliated with larger firms, in entrepreneurship training for 
microenterprise has been especially important and promising. The challenge of replicating and 
multiplying such efforts remains a large one, however. 
4.2 Credit 
Probably the main policy tool traditionally directed at the support of small enterprise has 
been credit. In the case of SME the attempt to improve access has been a combination of trying 
to encourage or force formal sector institutions (commercial banks, etc.) to reach down to this 
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size range and of creating special state institutions to do so. Most of the countries which have 
founded public-sector institutions to provide credit to small firms in manufacturing and 
sometimes other sectors (Bruch and Hiemenz, Chap.6) do so at lower than market interest rates, 
tolerate higher levels of arrears and non-repayment, and generally make it easier for the 
borrower than private banks would. Both efforts have met with at best mixed success, though 
the lack of serious ex post evaluations precludes saying anything very definitive in this area.4 
For microenterprise. it has been attempts to design and implement quite different institutional 
arrangements (e.g. the Grameen Bank, rotating savings and loan associations, etc.) which have 
received most of the attention. And here too there is a notable lack of solid evaluations so our 
understanding of what works and how well remains limited.5 A good credit system must walk 
the line between too little or too unattractive access for small firms and too much and/or too 
favourable conditions. It is an element of conventional wisdom among many people in close 
touch with smaller enterprise that their felt need for better credit access is not a good measure 
of how much credit could productively be allocated to them; many SE believe that lack of credit 
is the source of problems whose roots in fact lie elsewhere, e.g. managerial or marketing 
problems (Harper, 1984, 45). Some firms tend to be overoptimistic through lack of experience 
in business; for them it is appropriate to use own funds in the first stage of business 
development. Evidence has shown that many firms can get established with the very small 
amounts of capital that they can scrape up from their own savings and from family and friends 
(Clapham, 1985, 28; Lim, 1977, 22). Some firms are understandably desirous of credit when 
it is so subsidized as to provide a profit regardless of how productively it is used. Where real 
interest rates have been very negative this situation has arisen with some frequency. 
While few students of small enterprise would argue that inadequate access to credit is not 
a problem at all, the increased information on the sector has both refined and narrowed the role 
which such access would be expected to play. The problems of making cheap credit very widely 
available to any SE which wants it are now more widely recognized. Profit-making financial 
institutions cannot easily provide a large flow of credit in small loans to firms with no track 
records and no collateral (Levitsky, 1986, 20-21). Public sector establishments may be able to 
do this but may lose a lot of money in the process and unless stringent in their demands for 
repayment may contribute to a lax attitude towards repayment on the part of the borrowers. The 
general consensus now seems to be that a very low interest rate is not of great importance to SE 
Thus a recent World Bank review (1991, 77) concludes that its SME lending programs in a groups of five 
countries have varied from basically successful to substantially less so. It accepts that much in this area is still 
experimental. 
The most ambitious attempt to assess the impact of a credit program for SE, to the best of our knowledge. 
is that carried out by Bolnick and Nelson (1990) for Indonesia's KIK!KMKP program. Using a control group of 
non-borrowers they attempted to measure the impact of the credits on employment, incomes and output in the 
borrowing enterprises. If the subsectors and regions included were representative, the U.S. $228 million credit 
approvals in 1980 would have led to U.S. $73.7 million in additional fixed investment, 67,000 new jobs (at $1,100 
per job) and an increase in annual value added of U.S. $46.6 million for a marginal output-capital ratio of 0.63 and 
a marginal output/credit ratio of 0.20. 
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when it does borrow from the formal financial sector, though this conclusion may be valid only 
when the loan is for a short period. 
One of the problems in extending the formal financial system's services successfully to 
smaller enterprises lies in the fact that, in developing countries at least, most such systems 
appear to be high cost and relatively inefficient, presumably a legacy of their oligopolistic or 
monopolistic structure. (At the same time there is little hope of making this sector highly 
competitive, since it is characterized by special features which make it both difficult and 
dangerous to push too far in that direction.)6 With high profits and costly labour (paid more 
than in other sectors given the level of human capital) the payoff to operating in small amounts 
is low. The potential of financial intermediaries different from these traditional ones therefore 
takes on considerable importance. 
Some authors have in effect argued that the informal sector financial market works well 
enough so that there is no need to worry much about the alleged credit impediment to the growth 
and performance of SE (McLeod, 1984; Yotopoulos and Floro, 1991). While such studies make 
it clear that the informal market can and does handle some credit needs quite effectively, they 
leave open the question of whether alternative systems might outperform it in aiding the creation 
and survival of more and healthier SE firms; only studies which test for the relationship between 
the financial system and the overall dimensions and performance of SE are likely to avoid the 
biases resulting from the exclusive focus on existing (i.e. surviving) firms. Thus the only really 
persuasive test of how well an informal credit market functions would require a comparison 
across cases in some of which "better" access to the formal financial system exists and in some 
of which it does not. Few if any fully persuasive studies of this sort have been done. 
It is widely accepted that one of the reasons for the limited access of SE to credit from 
the formal financial sector is the higher cost and higher risk from the point of view of the 
financial institution.7 Such cost differentials go a long way towards explaining why credit goes 
disproportionately to the large scale sector. Another important reason, however, is that some 
private and public banks have direct relationships with certain of their clients, normally large 
ones; they may, for example, be part of the same conglomerate. Favouritism towards the 
"related" companies is natural and inevitable in these cases, and its presence calls in principle 
for some form of intervention to "level the playing field" among potential borrowers. 
The experience of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has demonstrated the potential of a 
quite unbanklike financial institution in dealing with very small businesses (Hossain, 1988) and 
6 Note DIaz-Alejandro's (1985) trenchant critique of the simplistic idea that an end to financial repression would 
resolve the problems of financial intermediation in the countries of Latin America. 
A study of Philippine financial institutions (Saito and Villanueva, 1981) indicates that administrative costs were 
lower in relation to outstanding loans for large scale than for small-scale borrowers (under 0.5% vs. 3.0-4.0%) and 
that the default risk expenses were also much lower, so that the sum of these two categories amounted to around 
6% of loan value for SE but only around 2% for large industry (ibid, 634). 
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has led many other countries to ask themselves whether they could replicate that success. 
Although rather different in character, the KUPEDES program in Indonesia (operated by the 
government-owned commercial Bank Rakyat) has also had quite marked success (Snodgrass and 
Patten, 1989). Even such absolute or relative successes, however, tend to add to the view that 
not just any institution can make significant contributions to the performance of SE through the 
provision of credit. The success of the Grameen Bank is often attributed to the very special 
qualities of its founder, while Snodgrass and Patten are at pains to emphasize the challenge of 
restructuring incentives for managers in such a way that the organization would operate less like 
a bureaucracy and more like a business responding to market signals. In 1992 a group of private 
investors founded a full-fledged bank for microenterprises in Bolivia, the Banco Solidario 
("Bancosol"), which today offers a range of savings schemes for small customers, has over 
60,000 customers and a portfolio of U.S. $40 million. With average loans of about U.S.$ 500, 
it has been able to make a profit (FUNDES, 1995, 2). The 1980s saw the birth of numerous 
private organizations supplying credit and other financial services to microenterprise and other 
small producers, the majority supported and financed from the outside. It is increasingly 
recognized that to be sustainable, "financial institutes which serve the needs of the small 
customer and aim to have a palpable effect on the national economy must first cover their costs 
and be profit-oriented themselves." (FUNDES, 1995, 2). As this and other lessons are learned, 
there is increasing hope that financial systems will be less biased against SE than in the past. 
frequently discussed than credit needs is the potential payoff to the existence of a 
source of venture capital for small and medium sized firms. Scitovsky has, however, made the 
interesting argument that the government's creation of such a fund in Taiwan contributed 
significantly to the successful growth of SE in that country (Scitovsky, 1985). 
4.3 Technical and Managerial Assistance8 
Apart from the shortage of financial resources, the other broad category of possible SE 
needs is assistance of some sort to run the business better. It may be training in managerial 
skills, marketing, accounting, planning or other techniques, help with technical problems, etc. 
It has often been noted that many small scale entrepreneurs are good at one part of the business, 
perhaps production or sales, but not at others. This is hardly surprising; the special feature of 
the small firm is that one person is often responsible for a range of quite different activities, 
activities which would be handled by specialists in larger firms. With time it has been 
increasingly recognized that some diagnoses in these areas have been too simple, e.g. the idea 
that the sort of bookkeeping and accounting which would be considered de rigueur in large firms 
is essential in all small ones (Harper, 1984, 68-69). It is clear, though, that many small firms 
have problems which could be at least in part alleviated by an effective technical/managerial 
assistance program. But, as with credit, it has proven difficult to develop such programs. When 
they are lodged in the public sector they must often overcome weak staffing and lack of 
incentive to have a good chance of success. When in the private sector they are typically too 
8 This section draws extensively on Berry and Mazumdar (1991). 
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expensive to be of much relevance to the very small and small firms, though they can be for 
those in the medium size range. 
Raising the productivity of SE can be achieved both by the development of more 
productive technologies which do not require large scale and by improved utilization of the 
technologies already available. While some technologies used by SE are quite competitive, 
others would need to be improved to be or to remain competitive. Most R&D expenditures in 
developing countries are concentrated on large scale technologies (Stewart, 1990; Crane, 1977). 
While the need for appropriate intermediate technology has been widely recognized and 
discussed (Stewart, Thomas and de Wilde, 1990), it is evident that the inability of SE itself to 
undertake the relevant R&D, together with the modest efforts (in both quantity and quality 
terms) by governments, implies a possibly serious lack. The issue has received less attention 
in the literature on impediments to/determinants of SE success than many others, partly no doubt 
because most of the people directly associated with SE are less inclined to think in terms of 
better technologies that "might have been" than of credit or other forms of assistance which 
appear to be much more tangible possibilities. More generally, the impact on SE of 
technological choice in LDC manufacturing as a whole has received little careful empirical 
analysis, a fact which Schmitz (1982, 439) explains in part by the fact that it would require the 
never-easy documentation of historical processes. Nelson's early model (Nelson, 1968) 
suggesting that diffusion of technology from more modern (and so normally larger) firms to 
those farther down the size scale certainly captured part of the story. Second hand machinery 
sales are central to the diffusion process, and in some countries and industries, subcontracting 
provides a vehicle for transfer of information from the large to the small. But in other cases, 
such channels may be outweighed in importance by the accumulation of small improvements 
which result from practice, trial and error, and practical insights of SE entrepreneurs and 
workers. Small firms have certainly demonstrated a good deal more innovative capacity and 
related increases in productivity than many observers have been inclined to predict. 
Although a good number of government programs have been directed at improving 
technology that is relevant to SE, most have involved only very modest amounts of resources; 
many are perceived to have had equally modest success, though it is true that since the benefits 
are not easy to measure, few if any studies have seriously attempted quantitative comparison of 
benefits and costs. Some institutes appear to have difficulty getting the sort of feedback which 
is important if the research activity is to bear on the real needs of SE; the large number of 
products encompassed in the SE sector makes it unlikely that state-organized research could 
touch a very significant share of them. 
Both governments and commentators have focused rather more on extension and technical 
assistance to SE than on R&D. In his review of services available to small-medium firms (of 
15 to 150 workers) in Thailand, Marsden (1984, 235) notes that a common feature of assistance 
programmes to small firms in LDCs is an Industrial Service Institute which provides research, 
training, technological development, information, marketing and other services to the firms. 
Such institutes have been operating for up to 25 years in some countries, often with the support 
of such international organizations as the ILO, UNDP, UNIDO, and since the early 1980s, the 
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World Bank. Many doubts have been expressed about their cost effectiveness and about the 
degree to which the services are available or could be provided through existing market 
networks. Marsden argues that the government can best contribute by establishing a good 
environment and appropriate incentives and by promoting the transfer of know-how in situations 
where market networks are weak or absent. 
Machinery suppliers also provide a variety of services to their clients (Levy et a!, 1994). 
Given their bias to sell rather than not, such suppliers will often not be reliable guides to the 
selection of the best technique/machine for a given SE buyer (Baily, 1977). Here other sources 
of information such as trade fairs are important (Marsden, 1984; Levy et al, 1994). Training 
provided by machinery suppliers has the advantage over more general training in that the skills 
taught are the directly relevant ones and are applied immediately. When provided in the client 
firm the conditions are the operative ones; new recruits are trained by the firm's own skilled 
workers. 
In general the very small firms have less access to the private sector services, so there 
is a strong case for the government to focus its efforts on these firms. More effort than has 
been typical in the past should go into the role of catalyst, attempting to bring the holders of 
relevant skills together with potential users; working groups to plan and supervise activities in 
each industry to be covered could be beneficial. Chile has been among the countries to establish 
a system designed to subsidize first provision of technical assistance by private sector suppliers, 
on the idea that subsequently the firm should be well informed enough to decide whether further 
assistance is worth the cost or not. 
It is clear, and the Taiwanese case may be the best evidence of it, that when there are 
lots of entrepreneurial skills, markets work well and information flows are smooth, the private 
market can successfully handle a wide range of firm needs. This leaves open, however, the 
question of what should be done before that happy situation has been reached. Unfortunately, 
the same countries in which private sector capacity is still quite limited are often ones in which 
the same can be said of the state. Japan's record and those of Korea and Taiwan remain of great 
interest, however, since government involvement does appear to have played a clearly positive 
role. 
4.4 Labour Market Conditions and Institutions 
Labour market imperfections and labour legislation can either contribute to a good 
environment for smaller enterprise or make that environment difficult. Most of the 
complications in this regard relate to SME rather than to microenterprise, which tends to hire 
few workers, especially non-family workers. But SME creates a great deal of paid employment 
and, in order to deal with fluctuations in its market conditions, often requires the flexibility to 
increase and reduce its labour force without much restraint (Cortés et al, 1987). High minimum 
wages which might have only modest costs in terms of their employment effects for larger firms 
might be more damaging, if applied with vigour, to SME. The same goes for high payroll taxes 
which raise the price of labour above the amount actually received by the worker. Uncertainty 
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with respect to how regulations may be applied is also likely to create a bigger problem for SME 
than for larger firms, both because they are in more vulnerable situations and because the wage 
share is larger for the SME firms. Some form of unemployment insurance, which may or may 
not be feasible in any given country, would have important advantages to SME, since shifting 
the costs of labour mobility from the employer to general fund would benefit them. 
The SME sector is thus an important one to bear in mind in the design of labour market 
institutions. With labour market reforms currently being implemented in a large number of 
developing countries, it is important that the needs of SME be well understood. 
At this time it is fair to say that too little is known about just how various elements of 
labour legislation or of labour market functioning more generally affect SME to allow anyone 
to design the ideal system from that sector's point of view. What is clear is that the needs of 
SME are seldom fed articulately into the pooi of information on the basis of which judgements 
are made. It may be that the reforms underway in many countries, most of which reduce 
government intervention and the powers of unions, will indeed be beneficial to SME and to the 
economies as a whole. But this will be less because they reflect a clear understanding of what 
SME needs than because of luck. 
At present SME tends to get treated differentially, defacto if not dejure, with regard to 
labour legislation, including the role of unions; SME firms have a lower profile, are harder to 
reach, etc. In some cases this defacto exclusion from part of the legislation may be as good 
an outcome as is likely to occur. The best system, were it not for the costs of implementation, 
would no doubt be one in which the elements of legislation were applied with gradually 
increasing intensity the larger the firm size. The risk entailed in a system where non-compliance 
is the norm is that it may lay the grounds for exploitation and harassment by rent-seeking public 
officials. And the risk of dispensing with all forms of labour protection on the grounds that it 
benefits SME is that the overall cost to labour may be substantial; if it turns Out that the sharp 
increases in income concentration associated with the introduction of market-oriented economic 
reforms are mainly due to those in the labour market, this will come to be seen as a serious cost. 
Mobility of labour from smaller to larger firms is a problem for the former. Wide wage 
differentials by firm size contribute to that risk for smaller firms, and are thus likely to 
discourage in-firm human capital formation. Yet the existence of such differentials may play 
a positive role also if they allow labour in larger firms to earn more while not greatly lowering 
the total demand for labour. 
4.5 Product Markets and Trade Policy 
Product markets which favour the entry and maintenance of small firms are important. 
Sometimes the markets which are filled by small suppliers are local in character and hence 
niche-like. But such niches inevitably shrink as transport and communications improve with the 
process of development. When this occurs most small enterprises have to base their 
competitiveness on high productivity or low factor prices. 
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Promotion of effective large firm-small firm linkages (in the form of subcontracting or 
otherwise) has, as noted above, generally met with only modest success, It appears that helping 
to lay the groundwork for such collaboration, by contributing to improved performance of 
smaller firms is likely to be more important than direct attempts to put the two types of firms 
into contact with each other, though like many other conclusions, this one must be viewed as 
tentative. Equally difficult is the design of effective regulations and practices which could 
protect smaller firms against unfair practices of more powerful ones. One of the great problems 
of economic management, and perhaps a largely unresolvable one, is the absence of an 
equivalent to "anti-trust" rules which might be applied to small firms. It is not that small firms 
are always the losers from the use of power outside the market; sometimes they are the winners, 
as when sellers squat outside registered firms which pay taxes to get the services they use. But 
a strong case can be made that they lose more often than they win. 
The most dramatic "pro-small" policy related to product markets is the reservation of 
certain products for small firms, as in the case of certain textiles in India. Such policies have 
been controversial (Little, Mazumdar and Page, 1987); they inevitably run the risk of creating 
inefficiencies over time even if the technology protected is relatively efficient when the 
reservation is created. They may be defensible in social and economic terms under certain 
circumstances, but it would probably require an astute and strong government to be able to 
manipulate them well. 
One of the criticisms of traditional import substituting (IS!) polices has been the degree 
to which they are designed in the interests of larger rather than smaller enterprise. To some 
extent this is a natural concomitant of the fact that the capital intensive industries in which larger 
firms typically tend to dominate need protection and are the natural industries to think of as 
countries push up the hierarchy of industries. To some extent it presumably comes with the fact 
that political power is related to size of firm. A less emphasized weakness of the protectionist 
regime in many countries was its bias against the importation of second-hand machinery; 
typically new capital equipment was given favourable tariff and quota treatment; at the extreme 
second hand equipment was prohibited. Given the central importance of second hand machinery 
to allow small enterprises to get started (Cortés et al, 1987), this policy was very pernicious. 
The lack of political voice by small enterprise no doubt helps to account for how such a strange 
policy could persist so long in some countries (e.g. Indonesia--see Berry and Escandón, 1994). 
Beyond the area of trade policy, the presence of a well-functioning market for used 
machinery can play a major positive role. Easy importation is one factor in such success, while 
other conditions, including a sufficiently large domestic market and the presence of good repair 
skills, may also play a role (Escandón, 1982). 
As markets become more open it is increasingly important to be able to survive in 
competition with imports and eventually to be able to export. Here there is no doubt that small 
firms can benefit from a good deal of assistance, and some interesting experiments have been 
undertaken in recent years. Export oriented countries of East Asia appear to be well in the lead 
in terms of the quantity and quality of support they provide to small and medium exporters. 
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Levy et al, (1994, 39) report that, in each of Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Colombia, private 
channels (buyers, traders, similar firms, subcontracting principals, etc.) are the most important 
sources of support for small and medium manufacturing exporters in the areas of marketing and 
technology. But the benefits of such private mechanisms are not available equally to all SME 
exporters; collective support (whether from the state or from business associations, sometimes 
supported by the state) were valued disproportionately by the less well-endowed though 
subsequently successful firms. "The record of delivery of collective technical and marketing 
support is a chequered one, but some promising new approaches appear to be coming to the 
fore. The most promising interventions are those with a "light touch": their delivery 
mechanisms generally are decentralized; and their goals are to support, rather than supplant, the 
private marketplace... tTIhe overall business and incentive environment is the most important 
determinant of the effectiveness of marketing and technological support for SMEs. However, 
the results also caution against complacency, against the presumption that a liberalized market 
place will be sufficient to secure industrial development." (Levy et al, 1994, 39-40). 
4.6 Infrastructure 
As with other elements of public policy, the norm has been for small enterprise needs 
in the area of infrastructure to come low on government priorities. In some situations rural 
electrification seems to have been the key to a flourishing rural manufacturing sector. 
Sometimes decent road connections, whether in rural or urban areas, are pivotal. 
Industrial estates were a popular element of industrial policy in many developing 
countries from some time past. Some were designed with SME in particular in mind. Many 
seem to have failed to attain their goals for lack of understanding of the hoped-for clients' 
economic situation. The idea that clusters of firms could provide important positive externalities 
was not in general wrong, but the understanding of what sorts of externalities mattered to what 
sorts of firms often was. Now, the cluster phenomenon is helping to clarify what is and what 
is not useful in this area. 
5. Overview 
Much has been learned about what works and what does not in the area of small 
enterprise policy. Policy has shifted increasingly in the direction of complementing private 
markets rather than trying to substitute for them, and there is much to be said for this shift. But 
there remains a major gap in many countries between the knowledge available and that which 
is applied, both in sectoral policy per se and in more general economic policy, where the 
interests and needs of small enterprise have seldom been taken into account. Rapid changes of 
context have also rendered some previous "knowledge" irrelevant and created new challenges. 
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